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Habeas Relief From Bad Science: Does Federal
Habeas Corpus Provide Relief for Prisoners
Possibly Convicted on Misunderstood Fire Science?
Marc Price Wolf*
INTRODUCTION
Since the rise of deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing
technology in the last two decades, courts and lawmakers in
forty-three states have modified their legal systems to allow legal challenges to old convictions based on DNA testing.1 These
statutes create the possibility that factually innocent prisoners
can be exonerated through DNA testing. DNA testing has been
embraced by most courts and legislatures because the testing
allows scientists to make reliable conclusions about matching
one sample of DNA to another.2
Yet biological evidence suitable for DNA testing only exists
in roughly ten to twenty percent of all criminal cases.3 Although DNA testing might be the panacea for innocent prisoners within this ten to twenty percent, in non-DNA cases, prisoners must find alternative methods to challenge their
convictions. For instance, what happens when an individual is
convicted largely on the basis of scientific conclusions that were
© 2009 Marc Price Wolf.
* Marc Price Wolf is a law clerk for Judge Claudia Wilken, United States District Court, Northern District of California.
1. See The Innocence Project, Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/304PRINT.php (last visited Sept. 8,
2008) (noting that forty-three states have post-conviction DNA testing statutes); see also Kathy Swedlow, Don’t Believe Everything You Read: A Review of
Modern “Post-Conviction” DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 355 (2002)
(praising the enactment of these state statutes while noting their possible
flaws).
2. See generally D. H. Kaye, The Forensic Debut of the National Research
Council’s DNA Report: Population Structure, Ceiling Frequencies and the Need
for Numbers, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 369 (1994) (analyzing studies conducted to
determine DNA testing accuracy).
3. See Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent
Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ.
L. REV. 655, 656 (2005).
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grounded in now discredited science?
In contrast to DNA testing, which is a new form of technology that can test old physical evidence, scientific advancements
that create a better understanding of the physical world, but do
not necessarily allow for the testing of old physical evidence,
are the subject of this article. Specifically, this article focuses
on scientific advancements that have changed a fire investigator’s understanding of the physical evidence surrounding arson.
Many scientific methods once employed by arson investigators
have now either been entirely discredited or at least severely
questioned.4 New methods for understanding fires and burn
patterns have been developed, but often no evidence remains
from old crime scenes to be tested with these new methods.
Part I of this article describes how the entire field of fire
investigation has recently undergone a complete shift in methodology and foundational principles. At one time, the methods
of fire investigators were rarely questioned. Now, newer generations of fire investigators are investigating whether old arson convictions were based on the inadequate methods of earlier fire investigators.
Part II of this article briefly describes the prevalence of arson in the United States and a few instances in which fire investigators relied on bad science to formulate the conclusion
that a fire was of incendiary5 origin. Thousands of people are
arrested every year for committing arson,6 but some of those
individuals may actually be innocent.
Part III of this article describes how prisoners convicted of
arson based on now-debunked theories can utilize habeas corpus relief. Though much of the old fire investigation methods
and principles have changed, incorporating these changes into
successful legal challenges to convictions is difficult. While understanding and mastering state habeas challenges to these
4. See Angelo L. Pisani, Jr., Historical Perspective on Arson Evidence, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE FORENSIC ASPECTS
OF ARSON INVESTIGATIONS 3, 4 (1995) (commenting on past fire investigation
literature and saying “much of it is not supported by science”).
5. Throughout this article, the words “suspicious,” “incendiary,” and “arson” describe intentionally set fires.
6. See FBI, Crime in the United States 2005: Arson Table 2,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/offenses/expanded_information/data/arsontable_
02.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2008); FBI, Crime in the United States 2007:
Table
29
Number
of
Arrests,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_29.html (last visited Nov. 26,
2008).
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convictions is an important endeavor, this article focuses on
federal habeas challenges. Even though federal habeas petitions are not necessarily the most valuable tool for a falsely imprisoned individual, this article focuses on this type of claim
because it is often the last legal challenge available to prisoners, and is therefore, arguably, the most important. Also, because the science of fire investigation has changed so much
since the early 1990s, prisoners challenging their arson convictions before that time have probably exhausted their direct appeals and state habeas corpus challenges.
Although this article analogizes the scientific advancements in using DNA evidence to identify individuals to the scientific advancements in understanding fires, the comparison
has its limitations. DNA evidence can often be used to exonerate individuals and undermine cases factually. However, a new
understanding of fire science will not as readily exonerate individuals convicted of arson. In some cases, scientific advancements in fire science might only partially call into doubt an arson conviction. Nonetheless, the comparison is helpful in
understanding how the law can simultaneously recognize important scientific advancements and provide relief to some
prisoners.
I. FIRE INVESTIGATORS
A. HISTORY OF FIRE INVESTIGATORS
Determining the cause of fires has been considered a special area of knowledge since at least “300 B.C. in Rome…. Roman law decreed that the Quarstionarius, the Roman equivalent of today’s state fire marshal, determines the cause of all
fires.”7 Though the study of fires began centuries ago, the field
has been slow to evolve scientifically.8
For example, a 1955 publication includes a section titled,
“How to discover whether a female caused the fire,” which describes the “fairly recognizable traits or techniques in common”
with female fire starters.9 The book notes that “[f]emale fires
tend to be a bit ‘childish,’ ‘silly,’ hasty, poorly planned[,] . . .
[and are] often spur-of-the-moment, impulsive, and ill consid7. ARTHUR COTE, P.E., & PERCY BUGBEE, PRINCIPLES OF FIRE
PROTECTION 2 (1988).
8. Pisani, supra note 4, at 3.
9. RAYMOND L. STRAETER & C. C. CRAWFORD, TECHNIQUES OF ARSON
INVESTIGATION 110 (1955).
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ered jobs.”10 The book also suggests that the fire investigator
should seek out women who appear “frustrated,” are having
“[l]ove and marital troubles,” are “pregnant,” or are undergoing
“menopause.”11 While one does not dispute that arsonists
might have these characteristics, the fact that an arson investigation publication contains naïve conclusions based on unfounded gender stereotypes rather than scientific conclusions is
indicative of a field in desperate need of reform.
Until recent decades, “fire investigators have considered
the determination of origin and cause to be a mixture of art and
science.”12 The scientific basis was grounded in knowledge of
how various materials melt or ignite.13 “The art consisted of interpreting a variety of burn patterns, along with inferences
drawn from experience and material properties to locate the
origin of the fire and its cause.”14
A 1977 publication by the U.S. Department of Justice
noted that the “[i]nterpretation of burn indicators is a principal
means of determining the causes of fires” as well as “the most
common method of establishing arson . . . .”15 Yet the same
publication recognized that “[a]lthough burn indicators are
widely used to establish the causes of fires, they have received
little or no scientific testing. There appears to be no published
material in the scientific literature to substantiate their validity.”16 Notwithstanding this less than resounding endorsement, the Department of Justice detailed how an investigator
should identify and analyze seven types of burn patterns: alligatoring effect, crazing of glass, depth of char, line of demarcation, sagged furniture springs, spalling, and freezing of
leaves.17
10. Id. at 111.
11. Id. at 113.
12. Richard L.P. Custer, Considerations for Arson Investigations in NFPA
921—Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE FORENSIC ASPECTS OF ARSON
INVESTIGATIONS 31, 31 (1995).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. JOHN F. BOUDREAU ET AL., ARSON AND ARSON INVESTIGATION:
SURVEY AND ASSESSMENT 87 (1977).
16. Id. at 88.
17. The Department of Justice described seven burn indicators:
Alligatoring effect: checkering of charred wood, giving it the appearance of alligator skin. Large, rolling blisters indicate rapid, intense
heat, while small, flat alligatoring indicates long, low heat.
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Despite the lack of scientific testing, these burn indicators
became the tools of fire investigators “through the application
of post hoc ergo propter hoc logic.”18 Combine this trend with
the common practice of arson investigators learning their trade
through apprenticeships, as opposed to a standardized curriculum, and it is easy to see how fallacious scientific conclusions
permeate the field of fire investigations.19 For instance, “if a
hole were found in the floor after a fire where gasoline was
known to have started or accelerated the fire, the presence of a
hole in the next fire investigated indicated the use of gasoline
in the second fire.”20 This conclusion is not necessarily correct
because many aspects of a fire or the extinguishing process can
create holes in floors.21
In the 1970s scientists began studying methods to “control
the ignition, spread, and growth of fires in buildings,” which
are called compartment fires.22 The research showed that
many types of fires progress unpredictably, but compartment
fires have particular characteristics.23 In 1984 the National
Crazing of glass: formation of irregular cracks in glass due to rapid,
intense heat—possible fire accelerant.
Depth of char: depth of burning of wood—used to determine the
length of burn and thereby locate the point of origin of the fire.
Line of demarcation: boundary between charred and uncharred material. On floors or rugs, a puddle shaped line of demarcation is believed to indicate a liquid fire accelerant. In the cross section of wood,
a sharp, distinct line of demarcation indicates a rapid intense fire.
Sagged furniture springs: because of the heat required for furniture
springs to collapse from their own weight (1150ºF) and because of the
insulating effect of the upholstery, sagged springs are believed to be
possible only in either a fire originating inside the cushions) as from a
cigarette rolling between the cushions) or an external fire intensified
by a fire accelerant.
Spalling: breaking off of pieces of the surface of concrete, cement, or
brick due to intense heat. Brown stains around the spall indicate the
use of a fire accelerant.
Freezing of leaves: drying of leaves in a forest fire into their position
at the time of the fire. Since leaves turn during the day to face the
sun, their position indicates the time of day.
Id. at 87–88.
18. Custer, supra note 12. The Latin phrase “post hoc ergo propter hoc”
means “after this, therefore because of this.”
19. Id. at 32.
20. Id. at 31.
21. Id. at 32.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see generally DOUGAL DRYSDALE, AN INTRODUCTION TO FIRE
DYNAMICS (1985); NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 907M: MANUAL FOR THE
DETERMINATION OF ELECTRICAL FIRE CAUSES (1988 ed. 1988) (“This manual
is intended to provide methods to more clearly define the equipment and asso-
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Fire Protection Association (“NFPA”) formed a committee on
fire investigation in order to unite the fire investigation and
fire science communities to assess the science behind fire investigations.24 The committee sought to create guidelines for investigators to use to determine the “origin and development” of
intentionally set fires.25
In 1992, after incorporating over 280 comments from the
fire protection and fire investigation community, the NFPA
published the first edition of NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations (“Guide”).26 The NFPA most recently
published the fifth edition of the Guide and is continually updating the Guide to keep pace with scientific advancements.27
In 2000 the U.S. Department of Justice issued a research report entitled Fire and Arson Scene Evidence: A Guide for Public
Safety Personnel, which stated that the Guide “has become a
benchmark for the training and expertise of everyone who purports to be an expert in the origin and cause determination of
fires.”28 The Guide is now recognized in courts around the
country as the national standard of care for fire investigations.29 Even though the Guide has existed for over a decade,
ciated cause of the fire once the investigation begins to focus on the electrical
equipment.”).
24. Custer, supra note 12, at 32.
25. See id. at 32–33.
26. Id. at 33.
27. The latest edition of NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION
INVESTIGATIONS was published in Spring 2008. See NFPA, NFPA Catalog,
http://www.nfpa.org/catalog/product.asp?pid=92108&src=nfpa&order_src=A29
2 (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
28. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIRE AND ARSON SCENE EVIDENCE: A GUIDE
FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PERSONNEL 6 (2000).
29. See e.g., Workman v. AB Electrolux Corp., No. 03-4195-JAR, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16306, at *31 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 2005) (“Martin developed his opinions based on the methodology set forth in NFPA 921, which represents the
national standard with regard to appropriate methodology for investigation by
fire science experts.”); Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 849–
50 (D. Ohio 2004) (“NFPA-921 is a recognized guide for assessing the reliability of expert testimony in fire investigations.”); Tunnell v. Ford Motor Co., 330
F. Supp. 2d 707, 725 (W.D. Va. 2004) (“Many courts have recognized NFPA
921 as ‘a peer reviewed and generally accepted standard in the fire investigation community.’”); McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp., 214 F.R.D. 646, 653 (D. Kan.
2003) (“The ‘gold standard’ for fire investigations is codified in NFPA 921, and
its testing methodologies are well known in the fire investigation community
and familiar to the courts.”); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Joseph Daniel Const.,
Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 423, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The NFPA 921 sets forth professional standards for fire and explosion investigations . . . .”); Chester Valley
Coach Works v. Fisher-Price, Inc., No. 99 CV 4197, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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many fire investigators still employ scientifically disproved
techniques to locate fire origins.30
B. BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF FIRE SCIENCE
A thorough understanding of fire science requires countless
hours of study and training.31 This section provides a brief
overview of the science to introduce the reader to the basic
principles of fire science. There are four basic components to
any fire: “fuel, [an] oxidizing agent, . . . heat, and [an] uninhibited chemical chain reaction.”32 Taking away any one of these
components will suppress a fire.33
Fuel can exist in various forms, and is defined as “any substance that can undergo combustion.”34 Fuel can exist as a
solid, such as wood or plastic; it can exist as a liquid, such as
gasoline; or it can exist as a vapor, such as natural gas.35 “In
most fire situations, the oxidizing agent is the oxygen in the
earth’s atmosphere.”36 However, chemical oxidizers, such as
ammonium nitrate fertilizer can take the place of atmospheric
oxygen.37 The combination of fuel and oxidizing agent required
to create a fire depends in large part on temperature. In higher
temperatures, less oxygen is required, while in lower temperature environments, more oxygen is required.38 At each temperature there exists a certain fuel/oxygen ratio range at which

15902, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2001) (“[The expert] acknowledges that NFPA
921 is the authoritative comprehensive guide to accepted procedures and techniques for fire investigations.”); Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
150 F. Supp. 2d 360, 366 (D. Conn. 2001) (describing the NFPA 921 as “a peer
reviewed and generally accepted standard in the fire investigation community”); Abon, Ltd. v. Transcontinental Ins., No. 2004-CA-0029, 2005 WL
1414486, at *10 (Ohio App. June 16, 2005) (“The National Fire Protection Association 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations (‘NFPA 921’) is a
peer reviewed and generally accepted standard in the fire investigation community.”).
30. See Custer, supra note 12, at 32 (“Many erroneous fire origins and
cause indicators . . . . persist today . . . .”).
31. NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION
INVESTIGATIONS 921–15 (2004 ed. 2004) (“The body of knowledge associated
with combustion and fire would easily fill several textbooks.”).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 921–16.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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combustion can occur.39
The heat component of a fire represents the amount of energy needed to sustain a fire. Heat “promotes fire growth and
flame spread by maintaining a continuous cycle of fuel production and ignition.”40 An uninhibited chemical reaction results
in “the rapid oxidation of a fuel, producing heat, light, and a
variety of chemical by-products.”41
An important concept in modern fire science is heat transfer. Heat transfer is the “transfer of heat energy from one point
to another caused by a temperature difference between those
points.”42 Understanding heat transfer is vital for arson investigators because heat transfer is responsible for much of the
physical evidence left behind in a fire scene.43 Once an arson
investigator understands heat transfer and flame spread, the
investigator can identify fire patterns, the nature of the flames,
and heat and smoke movements in a structure.44 Identifying
these patterns helps investigators locate the point of fire origin.45
C. SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS IN UNDERSTANDING FIRES
Once scientists and researchers began to test the reliability
of using burn patterns to determine the origin and progression
of fires, many foundational principles of fire investigators were
deemed incorrect. One of the most important conclusions
reached by researchers is that certain types of compartment
fires burn at predictable rates and in somewhat predictable
patterns.46 Yet these conclusions are drastically different from
previously held beliefs among fire investigators.47
1. Flashover
“A fast-growing fire is often interpreted by investigators as
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 921–17.
43. Id. (“Heat transfer is also responsible for much of the physical evidence used by investigators who attempt to establish a fire’s origin and
cause.”).
44. Id. at 921–30.
45. Id.
46. See generally Custer, supra note 12, at 32–35.
47. Id.
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an indicator of arson.”48 The rapid spread of fire was considered
indicative of an accelerant and not a result of normal fire behavior.49 However, the concept of a flashover describes how a
non-incendiary compartment fire can spread at the same
alarming rate that fire investigators once only attributed to arson.50
When a fire starts “in a compartment,” such as a room in a
building, “the smoke rises to the ceiling above the fire and
spreads outward, forming a layer.”51 As the fire continues to
burn, the smoke grows thicker and the temperature within that
initial layer skyrockets.52 If the layer reaches a temperature of
roughly 1100ºF, the fire reaches a flashover point, where any
item near the layer of smoke could combust.53 Postflashover
burning may be responsible for low-wall burning, floor-burn
patterns, and even holes in the floor.54 Each of these indicators
has been used by fire investigators in the past to conclude that
a fire was incendiary in origin.55 Moreover, a flashover can occur within one and one-half minutes from the initial spark or
open flame.56 Given the facts of the flashover phenomenon, fire
investigators should no longer use these burn patterns alone to
conclude that an accelerant was used in setting a fire.
2. Wood Charring
Early fire investigators associated certain types of wood
char with the use of liquid accelerants.57 In 1972 one author
noted that “[t]he application of petroleum products to wood
causes a deep burning. Smaller, deeper alligator effects appear
than from charring by applied heat only.”58 A 1982 publication
noted that “[g]enerally, alligatoring is smaller the closer one
gets to the point of origin if the fire developed normally. . . .
Large alligatoring should be considered an indication of the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 32.
See Pisani, supra note 4, at 5.
See Custer, supra note 12, at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Pisani, supra note 4, at 9.
Id.; see Custer, supra note 12, at 32.
NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION
INVESTIGATIONS 921–18 (1995).
57. See Custer, supra note 12, at 34.
58. BENJAMIN S. HURON, ELEMENTS OF ARSON INVESTIGATION 28 (1976).
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nearby presence of a flammable or combustible liquid.”59 As
these comments suggest, it was widely believed that “the presence of large shiny blisters (alligator char) is proof that a liquid
accelerant was present during the fire.”60 However, the Guide
reported in 1995 that “[t]he appearance of the char and cracks
has been given meaning by the fire investigation community
beyond what has been substantiated by controlled experimentation”61 and cautioned that fire investigators should not “claim
indications of [an] accelerant on the basis of the appearance of
the char alone.”62
Also, fire investigators used to believe that fire charred at
a rate of one inch in forty to forty-five minutes 63 and would use
this rate to estimate burn times and to evaluate suspects’ alibis. In actuality, rate of charring is a function of many independent factors such as the species of wood, the geometry of the
material exposed, and the fire’s ventilation.64 In fact, charring
rates vary from four-tenths of an inch to ten inches per hour.65
3. Spalling
“Spalling is a physical process of the breakdown of surface
layers of masonry . . . which crumble into small pebble-like
pieces in response to high temperatures and/or mechanical
pressure.”66 Fire investigators used to conclude that spalling
indicated arson.67 “The use of spalling evidence [was] one of
the most misunderstood and improperly used evidential elements” in fire investigations until fire investigators began us59. INT’L FIRE SERV. TRAINING ASS’N, FIRE CAUSE DETERMINATION 48 (1st
ed. 1982).
60. NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, supra note 31, at 921–26.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See CHARLES L. ROBLEE ET AL., THE INVESTIGATION OF FIRES 37 (2d
ed. 1988).
64. NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, supra note 56, at 921–26.
65. See DRYSDALE, supra note 23, at 182.
66. Cathleen E. Corbitt-Dipierro, Fire Investigation Mythunderstandings:
Examining Long-Held Truths About Fire Dynamics, Physical Indicators of Incendiary
Fires,
and
Fire
Investigation
Techniques,
http://www.interfire.org/features/myths.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
67. See INNOCENCE PROJECT ARSON REVIEW COMM., REPORT ON THE
PEER REVIEW OF THE EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE CASES OF STATE OF TEXAS V.
CAMERON TODD WILLINGHAM AND STATE OF TEXAS V. ERNEST RAY WILLIS 38,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ArsonReviewReport.pdf (last visited Apr.
18, 2007) [hereinafter INNOCENCE PROJECT ARSON REVIEW].
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ing the Guide in the mid-to-late 1990s.68 In reality, spalling
can be the result of exposure to any high rate of heating or the
rapid cooling of heated concrete.69 Spalling alone is not an indication of arson.70
4. Collapsed Springs
Often, fire investigators will examine bed and couch
springs and conclude that if bed springs were burned from underneath, this indicates that an accelerant must have been present underneath the springs.71 This type of thinking fails to
acknowledge the reality of a flashover, and assumes that since
heat rises, any low burning must be from a source originating
on the ground.72 In fact, fire investigators who do not understand the concept of flashover often think floors should never
burn through unless triggered by an accelerant.73
In 1997 the United States Fire Administration performed a
series of burn tests and published its findings.74 In one test,
the researchers allowed a compartment fire to flashover for
several minutes before extinguishing the blaze.75 The report
noted that after flashover the fire spread and caused damage to
the floor under the bed.76 Thus, collapsed springs are not necessarily an indicator of arson.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) lab in Quantico, Virginia also tested whether collapsed springs were a reliable indicator of flame exposure.77 The FBI concluded that although liquid accelerants can cause spring collapse, factors
such as exposure time, load on the spring, and cooling history

68. NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, supra note 31, at 921–27.
69. See JOHN J. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION
455–56 (2006) [hereinafter Lentini, Scientific Protocols].
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. ADMIN., UNITED STATES FIRE
ADMINISTRATION, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES FIRE ADMINISTRATION
PROGRAM FOR THE STUDY OF FIRE PATTERNS 178 (1997) (depicting collapsed
springs).
72. John J. Lentini, A Calculated Arson, FIRE & ARSON INVESTIGATOR,
Apr. 1999, at 20, 23 [hereinafter Lentini, A Calculated Arson].
73. Id. at 23–24.
74. See generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. ADMIN., supra note 71.
75. Id. at 1.
76. Id. at 39, 178–79.
77. William A. Tobin & Keith L. Monson, Collapsed Spring Observations
in Arson Investigations: A Critical Metallurgical Evaluation, 25 FIRE TECH.
317, 328–29 (1989).
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all affect whether springs collapse.78 Further, it concluded that
“the ‘collapsed’ state of coiled furniture/bedding springs is not a
reliable indicator” of either smoldering or flaming exposure.79
5. Other Burn Patterns
Fire investigators used to interpret several types of burn
patterns to suggest the use of accelerants.
In the past, if the burns on a wall reached down to the floor level or
got under a door, furniture, or baseboard, or caused a pool-shaped or
irregular-shaped burn pattern on the floor, or a hole in the carpeting
or floor, they were considered to be indicative of the presence of a
flammable liquid.80

One of the first editions of the NFPA 921 stated that the effects of flashover in a compartment fire, along with several
other naturally occurring phenomena, can cause the same
burning results as would a liquid accelerant.81 Controlled burn
experiments have shown that burn patterns in the shape of
spilled liquids can be the result of postflashover burning near
the floor level, burning of melted foam plastic materials, or
cluttering on the floor, allowing exposed areas to selectively
burn.82
6. Damage to Metals and Coppers
One misplaced theory among fire investigators is “that accelerants burn at higher temperatures than ordinary combustibles.”83 Thus, fire investigators would conclude the presence of
arson if copper and steel were damaged in a structure.84 This
conclusion was proven incorrect in 1991, when fire investigators examined thousands of homes that burned in the hills of
Oakland, California.85 The Oakland fire was not a result of arson.86 Yet, in that fire, melted copper was present in approxi78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 332.
Id.
See Pisani, supra note 4, at 8–9.
NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, supra note 31, at 921-33.
John J. Lentini, The Lime Street Fire: Another Perspective, FIRE &
ARSON INVESTIGATOR, Sept. 1992 at 52, 53–54 (1992).
83. John J. Lentini, Indicators of Trouble, http://www.firescientist.com/
Publications_files/IndicatorsOfTrouble.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
84. See id.
85. See John J. Lentini et al., Unconventional Wisdom: The Lessons of
Oakland, FIRE & ARSON INVESTIGATOR, June 1993 at 18, 18–19 (1992).
86. Id. at 18.
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mately eighty percent of the homes, and melted steel appeared
in over ninety percent of the homes.87
7. Accelerated Versus Non-Accelerated Fires
A real difference between accelerated and non-accelerated
fires is a difference in heat release rate, not in flame temperature. Heat release rate is the amount of energy released per
unit of time. Laboratory testing has shown that “[w]ood and
gasoline burn at essentially the same flame temperature.
The . . . flame temperatures of all hydrocarbon fuels (plastics
and ignitable liquids) and cellulosic fuels are approximately the
same, although the fuels release heat at different rates.”88
Ultimately, suspected burn patterns need to be verified by
laboratory analysis. Portions of fire debris should be analyzed
and tested for traces of accelerants; fire investigators should
not rely solely on visual cues of burn patterns.
D. POSITIVE SIGNS OF ARSON
This section of the article briefly covers some of the positive
indicators for arson. “The determination of the cause of a fire
requires the identification of those materials, circumstances,
and factors that were necessary for the fire to have occurred.”89
These include the device, appliance, or equipment involved in
the start of the fire, the presence of an ignition source, and the
type of material first ignited.90
The presence of a single indicator is rarely, if ever, enough
to conclude that a fire was set deliberately.91 Rather, the presence of these indicators may recommend further investigation.92 One such indicator is multiple fires, defined as “two or
more separate, non-related, simultaneously burning fires.”93
Yet fire investigators should be cautious about inferring too
much from multiple fire sources because “[a]pparent multiple
points of origin can also result from continued burning at remote parts of a building during fire suppression and overhaul.”94
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id. at 19.
NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, supra note 31, at 921–37.
Id. at 921–137.
Id.
Id. at 921–165.
Id.
Id.
Id.

WOLF.WEB

226

2/20/2009 4:21:46 PM

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 10:1

Another indicator is the presence of “trailers.” A trailer
may be present when a fuel has been purposely spread from areas throughout the room or house, leaving behind an elongated
burn pattern.95 Samples of the possible accelerants that left
the trailers should be taken and analyzed.
The presence of one or more ignitable liquids, or “liquid accelerants,” also indicates arson.96 Yet presence alone is less
meaningful if taken out of context. For instance, “[c]ontainers
of ignitable liquids in an automobile garage may not be unusual, but a container of ignitable liquids found in a bedroom
may be unusual.”97
“[P]roper analysis of fire patterns by an investigator depends on an understanding of fire development and heat and
flame spread.”98 As described above, when full room involvement occurs, “patterns similar in appearance to ignitable liquid
burn patterns can be produced when no ignitable liquid is present.”99 However, when overall fire damage is limited, some
patterns are more indicative of the presence of accelerants than
others. For instance, the presence of small or isolated, irregular burn patterns, or doughnut-shaped patterns, or “U”-shaped
patterns in certain areas of the structure, may indicate that a
liquid accelerant was used.100 Rather than relying on visual
patterns, investigators should always take samples from any
area where liquid accelerants might be present and subject
them to laboratory analyses.
Less scientific indicators are also helpful to determine
whether a fire was intentionally set. These indicators include
whether fire protection systems were sabotaged, whether valuables were removed from the structure immediately before the
fire, whether exterior windows and doors were left open,
whether there is a motive to start the fire, the geographic location of the fire compared to other arson fires, and the temporal
frequency of other possible incendiary fires.
Determining whether a fire was set purposefully requires
thorough investigation, laboratory testing of possible accelerants and samples, and a close visual examination of the struc95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. 921–166.
Id.
Id. at 921–30.
Id. at 921–45.
Id. at 921–47.
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ture after the fire. Because no single factor is recognized as
supporting a conclusion of arson, investigators must evaluate
the totality of the evidence and the context within which any
physical evidence was found.
II. INNOCENCE IN ARSON CASES
A. NUMBER OF ARSONS AND ESTIMATES OF INNOCENTS
Assuming that many techniques and tools fire investigators rely on to determine incendiary fires are based on an outdated understanding of the relevant science, it is possible that
innocent people are convicted for arson based primarily on evidence grounded in misunderstood science. This assertion is especially true for individuals convicted of arson prior to the
1970s, when none of the new scientific advancements in understanding fires had been made. Analyzing the number of arsons
each year may provide a rough sense of how many innocent individuals could be in prison for arson.
There were approximately 32,500 structural fires labeled
suspicious or incendiary in 2007 in the United States,101 killing
295 people and causing an estimated $733 million in property
damage.102 In 2007 roughly 15,242 fire investigations resulted
in arrests.103
It is difficult to estimate how many arsons result in the
conviction of innocent persons. However, one fire expert, John
Lentini, who has written about and researched extensively
trends in fire science and investigations, believes the older science contributed to the conviction of many defendants. As one
of the nation’s most established and reputable fire investigators, Lentini has conducted over 2,500 fire origin and cause investigations in his thirty-plus year career.104 He consults for
both defense and prosecution attorneys in cases in which a de101. MICHAEL J. KARTER, JR., NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION ASS’N, FIRE LOSS IN
UNITED
STATES
2007,
at
14
(2008),
http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/OS.fireloss.pdf.
102. Id. at 15 (noting that the property damage figure “includes overall direct property loss to contents, structure, a vehicle, machinery, vegetation, or
anything else involved in a fire. It does not include indirect losses, e.g., business interruption or temporary shelter costs”).
103. FBI, Crime in the United States 2007: Table 29 Number of Arrests,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_29.html (last visited Nov. 26,
2008).
104. John
J.
Lentini,
Resume
of
John
J.
Lentini,
http://www.atslab.com/PDFs/Resume_JohnLentini.pdf (last visited on Oct. 10,
2008).
THE
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fendant challenges his or her basis for an arson conviction.105
He has testified in over 200 cases, authored over 3,000 technical reports, and published eleven peer-reviewed articles on fire
investigations.106 Lentini has helped lead the charge to overhaul the field of fire investigation by lecturing around the country about myths in arson investigations.107 Over his career, his
testimony led to a dismissal or acquittal in twenty-five cases
because he convinced the judge or jury that the scientific evidence leading to the conclusion that a fire was of an incendiary
origin was flawed.108 Lentini estimates that currently 100 to
200 people are in prison serving long sentences, or even facing
the death penalty, for setting fires that were actually accidents.109 Gerald Hurst, a chemist with a doctorate from Cambridge University, also believes that many innocent people
have likely been convicted over the past fifty years—likely
based on the expert testimony finding, erroneously, that the
fire was arson.110 “You’ve got tons of holdouts—good old boys
who’ve investigated 5,000 fires and they are doing it the same
way they’ve always done it.”111 Some examples of such highly
publicized incidents are discussed below.
B. EXAMPLES OF POOR FIRE INVESTIGATIONS
This section of the article describes a few cases in which
fire investigators testified in criminal cases and relied on scientific methods that have now been discredited. These cases represent some of the most common errors fire investigators have
made, and the influence these experts have on the outcome of
the trial.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. John J. Lentini, Capital Cases: Third Seminar Series, Illinois Supreme Court Comm. on Capital Cases, Distinguishing Fact from Fantasy in
Arson Investigations (Sep. 8, 2005).
109. Email from John J. Lentini, Manager, Fire Investigation Division of
Applied Technical Services, Inc., to Marc Price Wolf, Law Clerk for Judge
Claudia Wilken, United States District Court, Northern District of California.
(Feb. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Lentini, Email] (on file with author).
110. Maurice Possley, Arson Myths Fuel Errors: Debunked Theories Plague
Fire Probes, Lead to Wrongful Arrests, Prosecutions, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 2004,§
1, at 1, 10.
111. Id.
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1. Beverly Jean Long
On January 23, 2003, Beverly Jean Long watched her husband, James, burn to death trying to thaw out frozen water
pipes.112 That night happened to be the coldest of the year in
Georgia. James was using a special heater, called a smudge
pot, to warm the frozen pipes, but he filled the heater with
gasoline instead of kerosene.113 This simple mistake cost
James his life when the gasoline vapors ignited, burning James
to death.114
Prosecutors and investigators approached this case as anything but an accident. The chief investigator for the Butts
County sheriff’s office, Michael Overbey, suspected that Long
clubbed her husband and then set him on fire.115 Overbey investigated as many as two dozen arson-homicides in his thirty
years in law enforcement and he was convinced that this was
an arson crime scene.116 He testified that the cracked concrete
directly underneath the victim’s body had the “characteristics
of a spaulding [sic] pattern associated with an arsonhomicide.”117 After Long’s body was removed, an outline remained on the ground, which Overbey stated was “a pattern
that’s typically associated with that of a flammable liquid . . .
what we refer to as pour patterns.”118 He concluded that the
body burned so badly that it must have been doused with a
flammable liquid because bodies otherwise would not burn as
quickly as Long’s did.119
The victim’s insurance company requested a fire investigator test remnants from the fire scene and testify to his conclusions.120 The investigator tested the smudge spot and was the
first one to discover the presence of gasoline, rather than kerosene.121 He noted that the exhaust stack of the pot was lined
with soot and charcoal flakes, which would remain hot and refuel the fire so as to continually burn Long’s body.122 The in112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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surance company’s fire investigator further testified that there
were no pour patterns present at the fire scene.123 Rather, the
patterns Overbey attributed to gasoline pours “were actually
the result of ‘heat shielding,’ a phenomenon caused by such
items as clothes, tools, or even a body.”124
When introduced at trial, the jury believed the fire investigator’s testimony over Overbey’s and acquitted Long of the arson charge.125 Not all defendants in arson cases are so lucky.
What happens when defense counsel does not have the resources to hire a good fire investigator? Or worse, what if someone was convicted for arson and the only evidence presented in
that case about the fire was grounded in outdated and incorrect
fire science knowledge?
2. Cameron Todd Willingham
On February 17, 2004, Cameron Todd Willingham was
executed by lethal injection.126 Willingham was convicted of
murdering his three children in a house fire.127 During the
trial, fire investigators testified that an accelerant was used to
set three separate fires inside the wood-frame, one-story home.
The investigators concluded that over twenty indicators of arson pointed them in this direction.128
The prosecution’s lead expert witness was Manuel
Vasquez, the Deputy State Fire Marshal. Vasquez confidently
testified that “the fire tells a story” and that “the fire does not
lie. It tells me the truth.”129 Vasquez concluded that the fire in
this case was arson, just as were most all of the 1200 to 1500
other fires that he investigated in his career.130 The remainder
of Vazquez’s testimony includes several inaccuracies. For instance he described the floor of the home as having several
“pour patterns,” which indicated “that somebody poured” a fire
accelerant throughout the home.131 As described previously,
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Texas Man Executed on Disproved Forensics: Fire That Killed His 3 Children Could Have Been Accidental, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 9, 2004, §1, at 1.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 28–29.
129. Id. at 29.
130. Mills & Possley, supra note 126, at 29.
131. INNOCENCE PROJECT ARSON REVIEW, supra note 67 at 7–8.
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these same “pour patterns” can also be present after a fire
reaches a flashover point, which is when the temperature of a
closed compartment reaches about 1100-1200 °F.132 Once a
room experiences a flashover it can leave patterns on the floor
that look like pour patterns.133 In this case, the patterns
should not have been used to determine an arson fire. Vazquez
was not challenged on cross-examination.
Improperly interpreting pour patterns was not Vazquez’s
only mistake in this trial. He incorrectly concluded that the
fire was arson because it burned “hotter . . . than normal,”134
because bed springs melted, and because there were “multiple
areas of origin . . . [without a] connecting path, [which indicated] that they were intentionally set by human hands.”135 In
fact, each of the arson indicators about which Vazquez testified
relates as well to arson as to a fire that has achieved full room
involvement and experienced a flashover, as this fire did.136
3. Han Tak Lee
In 1989 Han Tak Lee was convicted of killing his daughter
in an intentionally set fire of their log cabin.137 Lee’s attorney
did not even challenge the prosecution’s arguments that the
fire was incendiary, nor did he hire any expert witnesses of his
own.138 Rather, Lee’s attorney argued that the daughter
burned herself in a suicide.139 The fire investigator in this case
made conclusion after conclusion based on possibly inaccurate
science. The lack of a knowledgeable fire investigator present
to rebut any of these claims likely disadvantaged Lee in the
eyes of the jury.
Before the trial, a Certified Fire Protection Specialist, Dan
Aston, wrote a report on his finding of the fire scene, which became the basis for the arson claim.140 Even though Aston was
just a part-time investigator who had a day job designing
sprinkler systems, Aston testified that he had examined about
15,000 fires in his career.141 This number is very likely inaccu132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 8–9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 10.
See Lentini, A Calculated Arson, supra note 72, at 25.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 24.
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rate because even the busiest full-time fire investigators can
only investigate about 5000 fires in a career.142 Although Aston
was certified, his conclusions reflected an outdated understanding of fire investigations.
Aston’s first mistake was comparing the temperatures of
the fire against the American Society of Testing and Materials
(“ASTM”) time/temperature curve, which should never have
been used in this context. The time/temperature curve was developed in 1918 to describe the operation of furnace fires.143
Aston used the curve to conclude that “any deviation” of the
temperature of the fire at Lee’s cabin “would be evidence of an
excessive fuel load.”144 “Numerous experiments on real fires
[have proved] that the ASTM time/temperature curve has no
relationship to reality.”145
Using the ASTM curve, Aston concluded that in order for
the fire to burn as hot as it did, there had to have been about
three gallons of gasoline and home heating fuel per square foot
of area in the cabin at the time of the fire.146 This means that
the cabin would have been sitting in gasoline up to twelve centimeters deep in some areas.147 It should not take an arson investigator to realize that saturating a cabin in that much gasoline is highly improbable, if not impossible, for one person to
accomplish. Further, no traces of fuel oil were found in Lee’s
clothes after the incident.148 It would be difficult or almost impossible for Lee to escape such a fuel-laden fire unharmed, let
alone without any traces of the fuels that Aston stated were
present at the fire.
Another fire investigator, Trooper Thomas Jones, testified
at trial that the presence of crazed glass “indicate[d] that the
glass was close to . . . a point of origin” of the fire.149 As mentioned in Part I of this article, crazing of glass does not yield
any useful information about fires, and it can be caused by the
rapid cooling of glass, not just the rapid heating of it. Jones
also testified that collapsed springs in furniture, low burning at
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23–24.
Id.
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doorways, and holes found in the floor were evidence of a liquid
accelerant introduced on the floor, to allow the fire to burn so
low.150 Trooper Jones did not believe that these burn indicators
could be the result of a flashover effect.151
Lee’s case “[r]epresents the ultimate triumph of junk science.”152 The first edition of the NFPA 921 had not been published at the time this case went to trial. Though some scientists and fire investigators around the country knew enough
about fires to counter Aston’s and Jones’ conclusions, the state
of fire investigation knowledge was in flux at the time of Lee’s
trial. Arguably, back then, not many defense attorneys even
knew that the scientific bases for fire investigators’ conclusions
could be incorrect. Now, defense attorneys in arson cases
should know enough about the state of fire investigations to realize that they need to independently investigate all fires, and
not blindly accept the fire investigator’s conclusions.
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES
This part of the article discusses some legal remedies
available to innocent people convicted of arson where bad science was involved. The legal tools that a prisoner can use to
challenge a conviction vary tremendously depending on the lifecycle of a case. This paper focuses on federal habeas corpus
claims because this is the most likely legal tool available to individuals whose trials involved possibly now-discredited evidence of arson that may have influenced a jury. Since the science of fire investigation took great strides in the early 1990s,
there is a good chance that arson convictions any time before or
during the early 1990s involved evidence, opinions, or expert
testimony that today would not be credited. But, since many
years have passed, it is also likely that these individuals have
already exhausted their direct appeals and state habeas corpus
challenges.153 Thus, the only legal remedy available for many
in this group of people would be a federal habeas petition.154
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 25.
153. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)–(c) (2000) (requiring prisoners to
exhaust state judicial opportunities to litigate federal claims before presenting
those claims to a federal court in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus); Medwed, supra note 3, at 675-86 (describing the many procedural and temporal
state requirements to challenge convictions that prisoners with new DNA evidence must address in their legal challenges).
154. See Medwed, supra note 3, at 675–86 (noting that states vary the
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The remainder of this article discusses the general legal
remedies available through the writ of federal habeas corpus,
whether the statute allows for challenges that would arise from
convictions based on debunked science, and how successful
such challenges have been.
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF HABEAS CORPUS
The origins of the writ of habeas corpus can be traced back
to medieval English law. The phrase “habeas corpus” is Latin
and means “you have the body.”155 In a legal context, this
phrase refers to the original usage of habeas, which was to
challenge the disappearance of individuals in official custody.156
The framers of the Constitution recognized the importance of
the writ by including it in the text of the Constitution, “The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.”157 The Judiciary Act of 1789, passed during
the first session of Congress, created lower federal courts and
defined the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, and also ensured that habeas corpus was available to prisoners for “the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.”158 However, the Judiciary Act only provided federal courts the authority to grant habeas to federal prisoners.159 After the Civil War,
the Reconstruction Act allowed federal courts to grant habeas
corpus to state prisoners out of the fear that southern states
might persecute or imprison former slaves.160 Even after this
expansion, the use of the writ was limited to challenging
whether the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to sentence an
individual.161
Habeas Corpus did not become available to a broader
statute of limitations that prisoners can directly appeal their conviction from a
few weeks to a few years, and state habeas claims have similarly varied statute of limitations).
155. LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 1 (2003).
156. Id.
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
158. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
159. Judiciary Act of 1789 §§ 1–35, at 73–93.
160. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as 28 U.S.C §§
2241-2255); Max Rosenn, The Great Writ—A Reflection of Societal Change, 44
OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 342 (1983).
161. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 904 (3d ed. 1993).
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swath of prisoners until after World War II, when Chief Justice
Warren led the Supreme Court. With Warren as Chief Justice,
the Supreme Court decided a case that allowed habeas corpus
petitioners to relitigate all constitutional claims in federal
court.162 The Warren Court also decided an important case that
held that an individual would only be barred from raising matters not litigated in state court if it could be shown that the individual deliberately bypassed state procedures.163
Since the Warren Court, later Supreme Court cases have
narrowed the scope of habeas corpus relief.164 The most recent
shift in habeas law occurred when Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).
AEDPA created many restrictions on the availability of habeas
relief. New statute of limitations provisions were added,165 a
higher threshold to file successive habeas petitions was created,166 and the issues available for review were limited.167
Under current law, to secure habeas corpus relief, a person
must exhaust all available state remedies.168 However, state
162. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (holding all constitutional
claims can be relitigated on habeas corpus).
163. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (arguing that claims not raised in
state courts may be raised on habeas corpus unless the petitioner deliberately
bypassed state procedures).
164. See, e.g., McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494–95 (1991) (to file a second or successive habeas petition, petitioner must show cause as well as actual
prejudice or show a fundamental miscarriage of justice); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 309–10 (1989) (habeas petitioners may generally only assert rights
that existed as of the time of their conviction); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977) (stating that claims not presented in state court may be raised on
habeas corpus only if there is cause and prejudice); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims cannot be raised on
habeas corpus if the state court provided a full and fair hearing).
165. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1) (2000) (“A 1-year period of limitation
shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a state court.”).
166. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2)(B) (“[T]he factual predicate for the
claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due
diligence; and . . . the facts underlying the claim . . . would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that . . . no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”).
167. See, e.g., 28 U.S. C. § 2254(d)(1) (relief only available when the state
court determination “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States”).
168. Section 28 U.S.C. 2254(b):
(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that—(A) the applicant has exhausted the
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prisoners do not have to use state court habeas procedures, as
long as the issues have been presented and decided by the state
courts on direct appeal.169 Conversely, a prisoner must exhaust
available state court habeas procedures for issues not raised on
direct appeal.170
The Supreme Court and Congress have also limited the
types of issues that can be litigated in federal court habeas corpus proceedings. Generally, habeas petitioners seek redress for
violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. The
basic rule handed down by the Supreme Court is that habeas
petitions cannot seek to recognize new rules of constitutional
law.171 There are also limits on a habeas petitioner when trying to present issues in a habeas proceeding that were not
raised at the time of trial. The basic rule is that these claims
are procedurally defaulted unless the habeas petitioner can
demonstrate “good cause” for not raising the issue earlier and
“prejudice” as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.172
As an alternative to demonstrating cause, the Supreme Court
has held that a habeas petitioner may raise matters not argued
in state court by showing that the petitioner is actually innocent.173
B. THE FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS STATUTE, FACT-FINDING, AND
NEW EVIDENCE
First, it is important to sort through some of the intricacies
of the federal habeas statute to understand which sections, if
any, of the complicated federal statute allow for the type of
remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist
that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
169. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953) (“It is not necessary . . . for
the prisoner to ask the state for collateral relief, based on the same evidence
and issues already decided by direct review.”).
170. See, e.g., Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 677–78 (1948).
171. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
172. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991):
We now make it explicit: in all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent
and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the
claim is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal
law, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claim will result
in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
173. See infra section III.C. (“Actual Innocence Claims”)
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challenges that individuals convicted of arson based largely on
debunked science would need to bring. Federal challenges are
typically filed long after state court proceedings have concluded. As a matter of federalism and comity between state
and federal courts, federal courts presume the adequacy of
state proceedings and decisions.174 Specifically, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), a federal court must presume that a “determination of a factual issue by a State court” is correct. This
presumption can only be overcome by “clear and convincing
evidence” that the state court reached an erroneous determination.175
This statute may cause confusion when read next to 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), which allows a federal court to award relief
on the merits of a case if a previous state court adjudication
“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.”176 Even though under § 2254 (e)(1) a
federal habeas court can conclude that state findings were erroneous, despite the strong presumption in their favor, the
court may still find that those erroneous findings were not unreasonable.177 This makes sense because courts can make reasonably mistaken conclusions with respect to facts. Thus, a
court can both analyze the challenge under § 2254(e)(1), to determine whether any errors were made, and analyze the challenge under § 2254(d)(2) to determine whether those errors
were unreasonable.178
Yet § 2254(e)(1) is concerned with evidence that was
brought in front of the trial court. Prisoners convicted of arson
on the basis of science that has now been disproved did not
have a chance to present this evidence in front of a trial court
because the scientific knowledge did not exist or was not utilized at the time of the trial. Though § 2254(e)(1) does not pro174. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
177. See, e.g., Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he state habeas court’s conclusion that Woods failed to demonstrate that
he suffered from sub-average general intellectual functioning was not unreasonable.”); Whitehead v. Dormire, 340 F.3d 532, 539 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Whitehead has not . . . demonstrated that the state court’s determination of facts
was unreasonable . . . .”); McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1222 (9th Cir.
2000) (concluding that trial court’s decision was grounded on an unreasonable
conclusion about the facts).
178. See, e.g., Whitehead, 340 F.3d at 539 (stating plaintiff failed to meet
requirements of either subsection).
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vide relief to these prisoners, the Supreme Court has addressed
how these prisoners can obtain relief.
The general standard for determining when a federal habeas court can conduct its own evidentiary hearing to determine facts that cannot be ascertained by other means was outlined in Townsend v. Sain.179 There the Court held that a
federal court must conduct an evidentiary hearing (a) if a petition alleges facts which, if true, would establish a meritorious
claim, (b) if the respondent, in turn, disputes those allegations,
and (c) if there was no “full and fair” hearing in state court.180
Even if a federal habeas court is not required to hold a hearing,
the court nevertheless maintains discretionary power to hold
one.181
Though Townsend permits a federal habeas court to entertain these types of evidentiary hearings, a prisoner can be
barred from this type of hearing if the prisoner procedurally defaults with respect to fact finding in state court. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(2) states:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in
State court proceedings the [federal] court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that—
(A) the claim relies on—
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered
through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense.182

In order to proceed with an evidentiary hearing under this
statute, a federal habeas court must first determine whether
the prisoner is responsible for his or her own inadequate factfinding in a state court: prisoners who failed to exercise diligence in pursuing facts underlying a claim when they had an
opportunity to do so in state court.183 In most cases, diligence,
at minimum, requires a request for a state court evidentiary
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

372 U.S. 293 (1963).
Id. at 312–13.
Id. at 318.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437–40 (2000).
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hearing.184
The Court realizes that § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) addresses cases
in which the facts “could not have been discovered.”185 In other
words, in Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court openly acknowledged that a habeas court can hold an evidentiary hearing if the evidence in question “did not exist” to be discovered,
irrespective of the diligence that a prisoner exerted.186 Therefore, the court has interpreted § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) to endorse the
introduction of entirely new facts that came into existence only
after state court proceedings were completed.
1. The Application of 24 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) to New
Scientific Knowledge
Though the Supreme Court squarely endorses a habeas
evidentiary hearing for the introduction of new materials that
come into existence after a state trial, the Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether new scientific knowledge
that comes into existence after a state trial would also fall under § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii). While the Supreme Court has not spoken to this issue, there is no principled reason why new knowledge of a science should be treated any differently than new
material evidence.
The new scientific framework for understanding fires
should be treated the same as newly discovered DNA evidence.
This type of DNA evidence is regularly treated as newly discovered evidence.187 In a case in which a prisoner challenges a
conviction based on DNA, the prisoner uses scientific advancements to test a material to see if DNA existed at the crime
scene that would exonerate the prisoner. In arson cases, no
new evidence is necessarily tested, but many of the scientific
foundations for the conclusions scientists made to help convict
an individual have been completely undermined.
In an arson case, new science invalidates old scientific conclusions, instead of testing old materials for DNA. Theoretically, courts should interpret the federal habeas statute to treat
184. Id. at 437.
185. Id. at 435.
186. Id. at 435–36.
187. See Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, DNA and Innocence Scholarship,
in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 241, 244 (Sandra
D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) (“[E]ven when an inmate seeks
access to the evidence to perform a DNA test . . . the state courts have repeatedly deemed the access motions to be newly discovered evidence applications . . . .”).
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these two situations similarly, although they are not perfectly
analogous. In one instance a fire investigator might have concluded that concrete spalling and holes in the ground were conclusive evidence of arson, when in reality, this conclusion has
been proved false by a better understanding of fire science;
similarly, a forensic scientist might have concluded that the
blood type of the victim and the suspect matched, when in reality this conclusion has been proved false by a DNA test which
found the two samples to be a non-match.
A counter-argument is that this “evidence is not newly discovered evidence, but [merely] newly available.” as a result of
technological advances.188 Because it existed in some form at
the time of the trial, it is not in fact newly discovered. However, when parties attempt to introduce DNA evidence as newly
discovered evidence, courts do not respond by denying the request because the blood or other human particle evidence existed at the time of the trial. Rather, courts understand that
the blood or other human particle evidence takes on an entirely
new meaning once analyzed for DNA. Even though the presence of the material evidence has not changed since the advent
of DNA testing, the court’s understanding of the material evidence in relation to a prisoner’s conviction might change tremendously after learning the results from a DNA test.
Another counter-argument is that results from DNA testing and results from a new analysis of a fire crime scene based
on reliable scientific methods are not analogous. A DNA match
is performed according to specific scientific methods and then
an expert scientist testifies about the statistical probability
that the two samples are the same. In contrast, some might
argue that even with the new advancements in arson investigation, juries would still have to rely on an arson investigator’s
opinion about the cause of a fire. And relying on an expert arson investigator’s opinion is not the same as relying on statistical interpretations of DNA evidence. Why should an expert’s
opinion be treated as a new “factual predicate that could not
have been previously discovered through the exercise of due
diligence?”189 Opinions should not be treated as facts. This is a
fair criticism, to a certain extent.
In many instances, the results from DNA tests can prove
188. Penny J. White, Newly Available, Not Newly Discovered, 2 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 7, 11 (2000).
189. Section 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
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matches between human particle samples to an almost certainty.190 It is not clear that an expert will ever be able to
know how each fire started and progressed with this same certainty. However, many of the advancements in the understanding of fire science have developed to the point where the
indicators used previously to identify arsons are, simply, incorrect and unreliable. If that indicator was relied on to help win
a conviction, and there is no way that the presence of that indicator supports the conclusion that a fire was of incendiary origin, then the conviction itself is called into question. In this
manner, the analogy between the advancements in understanding fires and the advancements in understanding the identification of humans through DNA is a useful one.
Here is another way of understanding this analogy within
the legal framework of § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii); The factual predicate
underlying the claim that DNA evidence might call into question the validity of evidence used in a conviction is that scientific advancements have allowed for new types of highly reliable testing of human particles.
The factual predicate
underlying the claim that a different interpretation about the
material evidence at a fire crime scene might call into question
the validity of a conviction is that scientific advancements have
allowed for a more reliable and accurate understanding of how
fires start. The scientific advancements themselves create new
factual predicates that fit within the § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) framework. Therefore, in instances where arson convictions were
based entirely on now discredited science, courts should read
the habeas statute to allow for the introduction of this type of
new scientific knowledge.
Some may fear that reading the statute in this manner will
drastically increase the number of habeas petitions in federal
courts. This fear is likely unfounded because new science in
the arson scenario, unlike DNA, will rarely automatically exonerate the defendant. The new scientific understanding of fire
does not undermine a case factually in the same way as DNA
evidence does. For instance, DNA evidence can exonerate an
individual when the evidence shows that the individual was not
present at the scene of the crime or linked to the crime in any
way. In the arson example, even with the new understanding
of fire science, it is not as clear that scientists can say with the
same certitude that the fire was not the result of arson, or that
190. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 305 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc),
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the individual was not linked to the crime. The more likely reinterpretation of the old fire evidence will call into doubt the
old conclusions, not necessarily exonerate the individual convicted of arson.
B. SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS
A natural question arises as to whether prisoners can file a
second or successive habeas petition that challenges their arson
convictions. As a matter of fairness, prisoners should be able to
challenge their convictions based on a new scientific understanding of fires if that new understanding would completely
undermine their conviction. Yet, the Supreme Court has limited a prisoner’s ability to file second or successive habeas petitions in recent cases.
Most attorneys familiar with appellate decisions in criminal procedure know that repetitious habeas applications are
largely a feature of pro se litigation.191 Many prisoners are acting on their own, without the help of an attorney, when they
file first petitions, but are fortunate enough to obtain counsel to
help them file later petitions. Congress has limited a prisoner’s
ability to have more than one bite at the habeas apple.192 The
new standards set forth by Congress impose demanding requirements for second or successive federal petitions.193 Therefore, the likelihood of success for multiple filings is very rare.
A claim raised for the first time in a second or successive
habeas petition may be considered only if it meets the exacting
standards listed in § 2244(b)(2)(B). The statute requires that
the “applicant shows” that
(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered
previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a
whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.194

One aspect of the successive petition statute, § 2244(b)(2),
appears more demanding than its first petition analogue in §
2254(e)(2). Paragraph (B)(ii) of § 2244(b)(2) requires federal
191. YACKLE, supra note 155, at 56–57.
192. See generally Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.) (1996).
193. See YACKLE, supra note 155, at 254.
194. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).
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habeas courts to view new factual allegations “in light of evidence as a whole.”195 The phrase “as a whole” presumably includes the evidence presented at trial. Section 2254(e)(2) does
not require the court to consider any evidence originally presented at trial when deciding whether to grant a federal evidentiary hearing.196
This added requirement creates a more demanding test for
successive petitions. Though Congress intended to reduce the
number of successive petitions, this statutory requirement also
might eliminate habeas as a remedy for many otherwise eligible prisoners. It is not clear if this added requirement is severe
enough to close the courts’ doors to prisoners’ habeas claims
based on discredited science.
On one hand, if a court only looks at how the new scientific
understanding of arson applies to a particular conviction, a
prisoner is arguably more likely to be granted an evidentiary
hearing on this narrow issue. Yet, if a court looks at this new
science and compares it to the entirety of the evidence presented in the trial, a court may be less likely to grant an evidentiary hearing in the first place. Courts should grant the
evidentiary hearing, analyze the new evidence in that hearing,
and then compare the new evidence against the evidence as a
whole. This approach would allow the court to view the factual
and legal issues from a more complete perspective. As the
statute stands now, many innocent prisoners might not be able
to present their habeas petition because of the demanding requirement in § 2244(b)(2).
C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIMS
Even though it is generally the function of state trial courts
and juries to determine whether defendants actually committed
the criminal acts that they are charged with, federal habeas
courts have created a safety valve to address claims of actual
innocence. In the 1986 decision Murray v. Carrier, the Supreme Court noted that, “in an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction
of one who is actually innocent,” a federal court can address the
merits of a claim.197
195. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
196. § 2254(e)(2).
197. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (also noting that a prisoner can advance this claim “even in the absence of a showing of cause for the
procedural default”).
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While an actual innocence avenue to a habeas court exists,
it remains a narrow avenue of relief. In Schlup v. Delo the
Court held that a prisoner must satisfy the probable innocence
standard with “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or
critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.”198
A court must then decide whether on the basis of that evidence,
“it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him in the light of the new evidence.”199
“[T]he existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on
federal habeas corpus.”200 A prisoner must allege an independent constitutional violation in the state proceeding in order to
be granted habeas relief.201 In Herrera v. Collins the Supreme
Court clearly stated that a “claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through
which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise
barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”202 Later
in the opinion, the Court noted that “a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’” would demand a different result.203 In a concurring opinion, Justice White similarly noted
“that a persuasive showing of ‘actual innocence’ made after
trial, even though made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation of newly discovered evidence,
would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in
this case.”204
Recently, in House v. Bell, the Supreme Court was poised
to address whether the gateway of an innocence claim in a habeas petition could also be sufficient as a free-standing innocence claim.205 House was convicted of murder by a jury, and he

198. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995).
199. Id. at 327.
200. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993) (quoting Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)).
201. Id. at 400.
202. Id. at 404.
203. Id. at 417 (“We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this
case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional . . . .”).
204. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring).
205. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522 (2006).
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had procedurally defaulted his state habeas claims.206 In his
first federal habeas petition, he presented a variety of new evidence, including DNA evidence proving that semen, which was
attributed to him in the trial, actually belonged to someone
else.207
Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority of the Court, held
that this was one of those rare instances where House satisfied
the “stringent showing” required under the Schlup standard.208
House convinced five justices that in light of the new evidence
“it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”209 Therefore, despite the state procedural bars placed in front of House,
he was allowed to proceed in federal court with his habeas petition.210 Yet, under the Schlup standard, the habeas court’s
analysis must consider “‘all the evidence,’ old and new, inculpatory and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under ‘rules of admissibility that would
govern at trial.’”211
It is important to note that the Court held inapplicable the
AEDPA212 standards for second or successive petitions (i.e., §
2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)) and the threshold for obtaining an evidentiary
hearing on claims not developed in state court (i.e., §
2254(e)(2)). The court held that “[n]either provision addresses
the type of petition at issue here—a first federal habeas petition seeking consideration of defaulted claims based on a showing of actual innocence. Thus, the standard of review in these
provisions is inapplicable.”213 This statement is important.
The Court explicitly refrained from analogizing a gateway innocence claim analysis to that of a petition for an evidentiary
hearing or a second or successive petition. Even though these
statutes could have provided guidance to the Court, it chose to
proceed down a path unguided by the federal statutes.
Even with the newly discovered evidence, Justice Kennedy
noted that there was a fair amount of circumstantial evidence
against House, stating, “[t]his is not a case of conclusive exon206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 537 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).
See id.
Id. at 538 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327–28 (1995)).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
House, 547 U.S. at 539.
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eration.”214 Therefore, even though House cast doubt on his
guilt with the newly discovered DNA evidence, he did not satisfy the Herrera threshold for a freestanding innocence claim, if
such a claim exists.215 In the end, Justice Kennedy declined to
address the unresolved status of whether House’s freestanding
innocence claims exist. Yet he noted that if a Herrera freestanding innocence claim were to exist, House would have required more convincing proof of innocence than Schlup requires. Because House satisfied the Schlup standard, the
Court did not further delineate what the Herrera freestanding
innocence threshold would look like.
Though House did not articulate a freestanding innocence
standard, it can be read to require a high threshold. In order
for a prisoner convicted of arson based on junk science to prevail on a freestanding innocence habeas claim, the initial arson
conviction would have to be largely based on fire investigators’
incorrect scientific conclusions and not other circumstantial
evidence. House appears to stand for the proposition that as
long as a federal court can point to other circumstantial evidence that could establish guilt, irrespective of the overwhelming presence of the jury’s reliance on debunked scientific methods, a freestanding innocence claim will likely fail. While this
scenario would likely grant a gateway claim to habeas based on
innocence under the Schlup standard, it probably will not meet
the high standard set out in Herrera.
It is not clear just how many individuals in prison for arson
were convicted largely, if not solely, on the evidence presented
by a fire investigator. By one leading arson investigator’s estimate, up to 100 to 200 people are in prison for setting fires that
were actually accidental. Though arson prosecutions may have
complemented scientific evidence with evidence of motive or the
absence of an alibi, the scientific evidence is sometimes presented as the nucleus that made this other evidence relevant.
For instance, it is not unusual for fire investigators to conclude
motive based on scientific evidence. In Cameron Todd Willingham’s case described above, the lead investigator testified at
trial that because Willingham’s alibi did not comport with his
own scientific conclusions, Willingham therefore “told [him] a
story of pure fabrication.”216 The investigator concluded that
214. Id. at 553.
215. Id. at 554–55.
216. INNOCENCE PROJECT ARSON REVIEW, supra note 67, at 14.
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what Willingham “said he had done was inconsistent with the
burn patterns in the house,”217 and “all [Willingham] did was
lie.”218 Once the scientific bases for a fire investigator’s conclusions are proven false, it may be reasonable to evaluate a fire
investigator’s conclusions about alibis and motives that were
premised on those scientific conclusions. Individuals convicted
of arson based on junk science might be good candidates to test
the Herrera standard.
D. RECENT HABEAS CASES AND ARSON CONVICTIONS
1. Albrecht v. Horn
At the time of this writing, no post-House courts have ruled
on a freestanding innocence habeas claim stemming from an
arson conviction. Yet, one district court in Pennsylvania had
occasion to deal with this issue two years before House.219 Despite predating the House decision, analyzing this district
court’s opinion in light of the recent Supreme Court ruling is
instructive in predicting how post-House courts might approach
the issue.
In Albrecht v. Horn, Alfred Albrecht challenged his 1980
convictions for arson and the murder of his wife, mother, and
daughter.220 In addition to the testimony of state fire experts,
at the trial prosecutors presented evidence that Albrecht physically and emotionally abused his wife in the past, that he
abused his wife and threatened to burn the house down the
night before the fire, and that he had an empty can of gasoline
in his car.221 One of Albrecht’s fourteen arguments in his habeas petition was that “new developments in fire science
[proved] his claim of actual innocence.”222
It is important to note that before delving into the habeas
claim, the court held that Albrecht did not violate state procedural rules for challenging his conviction.223 Thus, the court
held that Albrecht was not procedurally barred from bringing
this habeas claim.224 This is an important point of comparison
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Albrecht v. Horn, 314 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
Id. at 457.
Id. at 456–57.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 461.
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in the context of House, Herrera, and Schlup. Albrecht was not
seeking to use his claim of innocence to overcome defaulted
claims and provide a gateway into federal court. Albrecht directly challenged his conviction in the habeas petition based on
his innocence.
Even though Albrecht was attempting to present a freestanding innocence habeas claim, the court applied the gateway
innocence legal standard in Schlup. The court restated the
Schlup legal standard: “If the petitioner asserts his actual innocence of the underlying crime, he must show ‘it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in
light of the new evidence.’”225 In the same paragraph though,
the court appeared to create a higher threshold for freestanding
innocence claims: the new evidence presented must “foreclose
the possibility of guilt, or at least of a guilty verdict.”226 Evidence that forecloses the possibility of guilt is not the same as
evidence that forecloses the possibility of a guilty verdict. In
this sentence, the court recognizes that foreclosing the possibility of a guilty verdict is a lesser threshold than foreclosing the
possibility of guilt. The former has to do with the reasonableness of a juror’s conclusion, while the latter would essentially
require the petitioner to prove his innocence. The Schlup standard represents the former, whereas the standard alluded to in
House appears to represent the latter. Even though at the outset the court claims to follow the standard in Schlup, the rest of
the opinion actually analyzes Albrecht’s claim against a stricter
House-like standard. It is possible that the court used these
standards interchangeably because it considered the difference
irrelevant to the facts of this case.
One year before this decision, Albrecht successfully obtained an evidentiary hearing in a federal court to present the
new fire science evidence.227 The court was willing to view an
expert’s testimony that debunked old science as “new evidence.”
It recognized the importance of granting Albrecht a forum to
present the new scientific evidence. The court did not agree
with the Commonwealth’s arguments that the fire science presented by Albrecht was not new evidence.228 The Commonwealth argued that at the time of the trial, in 1980, a French
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 464 (quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 465 n.9.
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text had been published which advised the insurance industry
of new scientific advancements in fire science.229 The court recognized that this book, “could not have been discovered through
the exercise of due diligence.”230 It was “not the sort of thing
that was available to fire investigators” at the time of the
trial.231 Moreover, the book did not contain scientific proof that
the contemporary fire science was wrong. Rather, it suggested
that further scientific testing was needed.232
After reviewing the newly discovered evidence presented in
the evidentiary hearing, the court recognized that Albrecht
“convincingly show[ed] that the fire science evidence presented
by the Commonwealth at his trial has since been discredited.”233 He presented evidence that “the fire science evidence
in this case was as consistent with an accidental fire—started
in an upholstered chair in a living room as petitioner claimed—
as with an accelerant fire intentionally started.”234 The state
offered no rebuttal evidence with its own expert.235 Therefore,
the court found that the fire “could have been caused either intentionally or by accident.”236
After this finding, the court then addressed whether “this
new evidence is legally sufficient to prove that [Albrecht] is actually innocent.”237 The court concluded that at most, Albrecht
proved that the fire could have been accidental. In order to
gain habeas relief, he had to prove that he “did not commit the
crime.”238 In the eyes of the court, proving that he did not
commit the crime is the same legal standard as determining
whether there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to
conclude that the fire was caused by arson. The court elevated
the Schlup standard as it applied it to this case. However, after
House, the Supreme Court would likely apply a similarly strict
legal standard to this free-standing innocence claim. Since
Albrecht’s initial conviction rested on more evidence than just
the fire science, the court did not find him innocent of the

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See Id. at 465 n.9.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2(A)(ii)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

WOLF.WEB

250

2/20/2009 4:21:46 PM

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 10:1

crime.239
Albrecht’s previous threats to his wife, combined with the
fact that the science still showed that arson was a possibility—
as was an accidental fire—was enough circumstantial evidence
to prevent the court from granting this freestanding innocence
habeas claim.240 This is similar to the Supreme Court’s analysis of the freestanding innocence claim in House, where despite
exonerating DNA evidence, there was still enough circumstantial evidence pointing to Bell’s guilt to prevent the Supreme
Court from granting a freestanding innocence habeas claim.241
2. People v. Chase
At least one state court has granted a habeas challenge to
an arson conviction.242 In 1995 Jack Chase was convicted of
committing arson in 1993.243 Chase allegedly removed a propane gas hose from a propane tank in the basement and intentionally set a fire.244 The fire damage showed that the fire
started on the second floor, but the People’s fire expert testified
that even though propane gas was heavier than air, it built up
in the basement, spilled into the second floor, and ignited on
the second floor.245 According to the People, all of this occurred
within fifteen minutes of Chase allegedly removing the hose.246
Defendant filed the New York state equivalent to a federal
habeas petition based on newly discovered evidence under
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 440.10(1)(g) (2006). This statute states:
New evidence has been discovered since the entry of a judgment
based upon a verdict of guilty after trial, which could not have been
produced by the defendant at the trial even with due diligence on his
part and which is of such character as to create a probability that had
such evidence been received at the trial the verdict would have been
more favorable to the defendant; provided that a motion based upon
such ground must be made with due diligence after the discovery of
such alleged new evidence.247

The defendant submitted three affidavits from unpaid ex239. Id. at 465–66.
240. Id.
241. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006).
242. People v. Chase, No. I-040-95, 2005 N.Y. slip op. 51125U, at 10 (N.Y.
Co. Ct. May 19, 2005).
243. Id. at 1–2.
244. Id. at 6.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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perts in which they argued that newly discovered evidence
since the 1995 trial would disprove the prosecution’s theory of
arson.248 On the basis of these affidavits, the court granted an
evidentiary hearing for newly discovered evidence and heard
two separate fire science experts testify that a dislodged propane hose in the basement could not have caused the fire.249
They testified that rather than settle on the ground, propane
immediately and readily mixes with the air around it.250 Thus,
if the propane tank were tampered with, as the prosecution
claimed, it would take several hours to create a combustible
mixture, not fifteen minutes.251 Further, since 1995, the type of
propane tank found in the fire had been recalled because it was
prone to rupture if unintentionally overfilled while cold, and
then warmed.252 The scene of the fire was consistent with a fire
resulting from this type of problem.
The People responded by arguing “that the properties of
propane have not changed since [the] discovery. . .” of the
gas.253 The court rebuffed this argument, stating “it is clear
that scientists now have a better understanding of those properties and how they work. The new knowledge better explains
the cause of the fire.”254 The court recognized that under New
York law a court cannot decide innocence in a collateral attack
to a conviction, in contrast to the ability of a federal habeas
court under Herrera.255 In the end, the court granted a new
trial because there was certainly a probability of a more favorable verdict for Chase.256
Here, Chase was granted a new trial based on the newly
discovered evidence. If Chase had not been granted this new
trial, and had exhausted his state appeals, he could have then
challenged his conviction in a federal habeas court. In a federal
habeas court, he might have succeeded on a freestanding innocence habeas claim because his initial arson conviction in state
court appears to be based entirely on the misunderstood nature
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 6–7.
253. Id. at 9.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 9 (“While only a new trial jury can determine the defendant’s
guilt or innocence, the newly discovered evidence is of such a character as to
create a probability of a more favorable verdict.”).
256. Id. at 10.

WOLF.WEB

252

2/20/2009 4:21:46 PM

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 10:1

of propane gas and propane gas tanks. Upon better understanding the science of propane gas and propone gas tanks, the
court would likely find that there is no way that the fire could
have been intentionally set. As opposed to Albrecht, where the
court found that even in light of the new evidence it could not
definitively conclude whether the fire was set accidentally or
intentionally, here a court would likely conclude that the new
evidence would have resulted in a more favorable verdict to
Chase. This finding would be the type of language that a federal habeas court would need to employ to grant a freestanding
innocence claim.
3. Souliotes v. Tilton
Currently, the Northern California Innocence Project is
representing George A. Souliotes in his habeas petition to challenge his 2000 arson conviction stemming from a 1997 fire.257
In this petition, Souliotes is asking for an evidentiary hearing
based on newly discovered evidence stemming from a better
understanding of fire science, or, in the alternative, habeas relief based on actual innocence.258 At trial, the prosecution
linked Souliotes to the fire scene because a substance, medium
petroleum distillate (“MPD”), at one time thought to be residue
of ignitable liquid, was found on his shoes.259 It has since been
discovered that similar forms of MPD are commonly found in
rubber shoes.260 Mr. Souliotes owns this common type of rubber shoe.261 Moreover, the chemicals on the arson scene materials and the MPD on Souliotes’ shoes are distinguishable.
Thus, the shoe cannot be used to link Souliotes to the crime
scene.262 Without the shoe evidence, the prosecution does not
have any reliable evidence linking Souliotes to the crime scene.
However, the district court did not address the merits of
the case and instead dismissed the habeas petition on statute of
limitations grounds.263 In his briefing Souliotes did not address
whether the actual innocence gateway of Schlup is applicable
257. Souliotes v. Tilton, No. 06-0667, 2008 WL 782479, at *5 (E.D. Cal
2007)(on file with author).
258. Id. at *5–8.
259. Id.
260. Id. at *5.
261. Id.
262. Id. at *8.
263. Id.
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to federal habeas petitions barred by the statute of limitations;
therefore, the court did not decide that issue either.264 The
court also did not grant a certificate of appealability, thus
Souliotes will not likely have the opportunity to address his habeas claim before the Ninth Circuit.265 Unfortunately for
Souliotes, no federal habeas court will likely ever grapple with
the issue of whether the new understanding of fire science
would undermine his conviction.
CONCLUSION
The state of fire science has undergone major changes in
the past three decades. Just as many commonly held beliefs
among fire investigators have been discredited during this time
period, arson convictions that relied on those scientific methods
may have been discredited too. Scientists continually revamp
their knowledge and methodology to conclude, with greater accuracy, whether physical fire remnants can be translated into
conclusions about a fire’s origin. Unfortunately, while fire science advances, many prisoners who were convicted of arson
based largely on now discredited science are left behind. Often
the main avenue of relief for these prisoners is found within the
federal habeas statute. Although the habeas statute does not
clearly anticipate challenges brought resulting from a debunking of old science, a fair reading of the statute should grant
these prisoners relief. The most attainable type of habeas relief
for these prisoners is an evidentiary hearing. A freestanding
innocence claim could be used to challenge an arson case, although success is unlikely.
Though the federal habeas statute can appear daunting, it
may provide the only avenue of relief for individuals wrongly
convicted of arson if they have exhausted all state remedies, or
state remedies are inadequate for this kind of challenge. If
courts treat newly discovered knowledge the same as newly
discovered evidence, these prisoners could turn to this statute
to attain relief.

264. Id. at *9.
265. Id.

